Church, the State, and Mrs. McCollum by Manion, Clarence Emmett




Church, the State, and Mrs. McCollum
Clarence Emmett Manion
Notre Dame Law School
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Education Law Commons, Religion Law Commons,
Rule of Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by
an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Clarence E. Manion, Church, the State, and Mrs. McCollum, 23 Notre Dame L. 456 (1947-1948).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/1018
THE CHURCH, THE STATE AND MRS. McCOLLUM
The first Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States provides that:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; ...
On March 8, 1948 the Supreme Court of the United
States1 decided in substance that this language prohibits the
tax-supported city school systems of the State of Illinois
from assisting and encouraging general religious instruction.
Just how a constitutional restriction against specified con-
gressional action can possibly impede the activity of a local
Illinois school board is an inglorious mystery of modern con-
stitutional construction.
The decision has raised an uproar of protest from law-
yers and laymen in all parts of the country. It undoubtedly
disturbed the equanimity of the Supreme Court itself. Only
four of the Justices were completely satisfied with Justice
Black's official judgment.' Four others 3 joined in a separate
concurring opinion and one of these four " added his own
particular reservations in the form of a third opinion. Mr.
Justice Reed dissented. In one way or another however, and
for one reason or many, the Court decided eight to one that
when the First Amendment says "Congress" it means, among
other things, a local school board and when it says "an estab-
lishment of Religion", it outlaws the approval by such board
of any activity during school hours which is calculated to
promote the interest of public school children in the exist-
ence and power of God.
1 People of the State of Illinois ex rel Vashti McCollum, Appellant v. Board
of Education of School District No. 71 etc.U. S ...... 69 S. Ct. 461 (1948).
2 Justices Black, Vinson, Murphy and Douglas.
s justices Frankfurter, Jackson, Rutledge and Burton.
4 justice Jackson.
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If, as one glib commentator has perspicaciously said' the
Supreme Court in this case had merely "upheld the Consti-
tutional right of Jimmie McCollum, age 12, to go to hell",
the decision would have sounded no general alarm. But the
conclusions of the court are definitely revolutionary in at
least two important respects.
The first and most important of these conclusions is the
judicial determination that religion and American govern-
ment have nothing in common and that both must hence-
forth operate in unrelated spheres behind an impregnable
wall of separation.
The second conclusion solemnizes the unfortunate mis-
cegenetic marriage of the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
a union, which for some unstated reason the present Supreme
Court has sought to effect throughout the past seven years.
In the legal and logical order the second conclusion precedes
the. first. A prior examination of its premises should conse-
quently turn up clues to the Court's tortuous but neverthe-
less certain determination that God must get out of the
American Public School.
The first ten amendments to the Constiution of the
United States are popularly known as the Federal Bill of
Rights. The scope and purpose of those Amendments was
settled by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1833.6
Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall then de-
clared that the provisions of this so-called Bill of Rights re-
stricts only the Federal government and that its provisions
were not intended, and could not be construed to apply to
the state governments.
7
5 Milton Mayer, Come All Ye Faithless, The Progressive, April 1948.
6 Barron v. Mayor etc. of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 8 L. Ed. 672 (1833).
7 "It is universally understood, it is a part of the history of the day, that
the great revolution which established the Constitution of the United States was
not effected without immense opposition. Serious fears were extensively enter-
tained that those powers which the patriot statesmen, who then watched over the
interests of our country, deemed. essential to union, and to the attainment of
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This conclusion thus reached in Barron v. Baltimore re-
mained the unquestioned law of the first ten amendments
from that day to this. Until the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868, there was no federal constitutional pro-
vision against the violation by a state, of the liberty or prop-
erty of any person.
The pertinent part of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; ...
The life, liberty and property of the individual person
was thenceforth protected by the Federal Constitution
against state encroachment regardless of whether such en-
croachment took the form of state laws or occurred in or
through the official acts of the states' public officers.' How-
ever, in view of the fact that the natural and constitutional
function of state government is to protect the lives, property,
health, morals and general welfare of its citizens, the Su-
preme Court soon decided that the Fourteenth Amendment
would not be construed to prevent any state from passing and
enforcing reasonable police regulations. In other words, state
laws which, in a reasonable manner, sought to protect the
health, morals and general welfare of its citizens were con-
sistently upheld, the Fourteenth Amendment to the con-
those invaluable objects for which union was sought, might be exercised in a
manner dangerous to liberty. In almost every convention by which the Constitu-
tion was adopted, amendments to guard against the abuse of power were rec-
ommended. These amendments demanded security against the apprehended en-
croachments of the general government, not against those of local governments.
In compliance with a sentiment thus generally expressed, to quiet fears thus ex-
tensively entertained, Amendments were proposed by the required majority in
Congress and adopted by the States. These Amendments contain no expression in-
dicating an intention to apply them to the State governments. This court cannot
so apply them" (ibid). See also Permoli v. New Orleans, 3 Howard 58, 11 L. Ed.
739 (1845), and Reynolds v. U. S., 98 U. S. 145, 25 L. Ed. 244 (1880).
8 Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 25 L. Ed. 676 (1880).
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trary notwithstanding.9 It is significant that before and
throughout this same period, the First Amendment"° along
with all other provisions of the Federal Bill of Rights, was
given a strict, literal interpretation against the acts of Con-
gress. This, of course, for the reason that the federal govern-
ment has no general police power, and, outside of the Dis-
trict of Columbia and the territories," has no general duty to
protect or regulate the health, morals or welfare of individ-
uals. 2
In spite of the direct and positive limitation that the
First Amendment places upon Congress, and in spite of the
absence of general federal police power, the Supreme Court
has consistently held that witkin the sphere of its delegated
powers, Congress may encourage the practice of religion.'"
It may likewise buttress federal territories and institutions
against the invasion of immoral practices, even when these
latter are represented to be religious practices.' 4
The Federal Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment thus went their separate constitutional ways. It was
natural and inevitable, of course, that judicial determinations
of certain language in the one would be consulted in con-
9 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 24 L.Ed. 77 (1876); Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U. S. 623, 31 L. Ed. 205 (1887); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 8 S. Ct.
992, 3Z L. Ed. 253 (1887).
1o "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Govern-
ment for a re-dress of grievances" (Article I of The Articles, in addition to and
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America).
11 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U S. 135, 41 S.Ct. 458, 65 L.Ed 864 (1921).
12 Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & W. Co., 251 U.S. 146, 40 S.Ct. 106,
64 L. Ed. 194 (1917).
's Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291-295, 20 S.Ct. 121, 44 L.Ed. 168 (1899);
Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 28 S.Ct. 690, 52 L.Ed. 954 (1908); Arver v.
United States (Selective Draft Law Cases) 245 U.S. 366, 38 S.Ct. 159, 62 L.Ed.
349 (1918).
14 Davis v. Beason, 133 US. 333-342, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637 (1890);
Reynolds v. US., 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1879); Church of Jesus Christ of
L.D.S. v. U.S., 136 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 792, 34 L.Ed. 792 (1890).
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structions of similar language in the other.'5 It must be ob-
served, however, that such constructions were by analogy,
and comparison merely. Not until very recently do we find
any decision which expresses or implies the identification
of the Fourteenth Amendment with any or all of the first
eight amendments."8 For more than fifty years following the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment the decisions agree
that some of the personal rights guarded against national ac-
tion by the first eight amendments are also protected against
state action because a denial of them would be a denial of
due process. They likewise agree that this is so, not because
those personal rights are enumerated in the first eight amend-
ments, but because they are of such a nature that they are in-
cluded in the conception of due process of lawY
15 "The Fourteenth Amendment, it has been held, legitimately operates to
extend to the citizens and residents of the States the same protection against arbi-
trary State legislation, affecting life, liberty and property, as is offered by the
Fifth Amendment against similar legislation by Congress." Hibben v. Smith, 191
U.S. 310, 325, 24 S.Ct. 88, 48 L.Ed. 195 (1903); French v. Barber Asphalt Pav-
ing Co., 181 U.S. 324, 329, 21 S.Ct. 625, 45 L.Ed. 879 (1901).
16 "While we need not affirm that in no instance could a distinction be tak-
en, ordinarily if an Act of Congress is valid under the Fifth Amendment it would
be hard to say that a State law in like terms was void under the Fourteenth." Car-
roll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U. S. 401, 410, 26 S. Ct. 66, 50 L. Ed. 246 (1905).
17 In Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 98 (1908), the Court examines the
view, "That the safeguards of personal rights which are enumerated in the first
eight articles of amendment to the Federal Constitution, sometimes called the Fed-
eral Bill of Rights, though they were by those Amendments originally secured only
against national action, are among the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States, which this clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against
state action. . . . It is however not profitable to examine the weighty arguments
in its favor, for the question is no longer open in this court. The right of trial by
jury in civil cases guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment (Walker v. Sauvinet,
92 U.S. 90, 23 L.Ed. 678), and the right to bear arms guaranteed by the Second
Amendment (Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 29 L.Ed. 615) have been distinctly
held not to be privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States, and in ef-
fect the same decision was made in respect of the guaranty against prosecution
except by indictment of a grand jury, contained in the Sixth Amendment (West
v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 48 L.Ed. 965). In Maxwell v. Dow (176 U.S. 581, 44
L.Ed. 597) where the plaintiff in error had been convicted in a State Court of a
felony upon an information, and by a jury of eight persons, it was held that
the indictment made indispensable by the Fifth Amendment, and the trial by jury,
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, were not privileges and immunities of citi-
zens as those words were used in the Fourteenth Amendment.. . . It is possible
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In general, the Supreme Court has found it possible to
construe the Fourteenth Amendment without any reference
to the first eight. In 1923 it said that
While this court has not attempted to define with exact-
ness the liberty thus guaranteed (by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment), the term has received much consideration and some
of the included things have been definitely stated. Without
doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home, and bring up children,
to worship God according to thte dictates of his own con-
science, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recog-
nized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of hap-
piness by free men.1 8 (Emphasis supplied).
The absence of any reliance upon the language of the First
Amendment will be noted in the foregoing quotation. Here
the Court was far away from a committment which would
have written any one of the first eight amendments into the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1934
the Court re-stated the substance of what it had held eleven
years previously:
There need be no attempt to enumerate or comprehensively
to define what is included in the liberty protected by the due
process clause (of the Fourteenth Amendment). Undoubtedly
it does include the right to entertain the beliefs, to adhere to
the principles and to teach the doctrine on which these stu-
dents base their objections to the order prescribing military
training.19
Concurring in the same case Justice Cardozo wrote:
I assume for present purposes that the religious liberty
protected by the First Amendment against invasion by the
that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight amendments
against national action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a
denial of them would be a denial of due process of law. . . . If this is so it is
not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight amendments, but be-
cause they are of such a nature that they are included in the conception of due
process of law." (Emphasis supplied)
18 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 29 A.L.R.
1446 (1923).
I Hamilton et al., v. Regents of the University of California et al., 293 U.S.
245, 55 S.Ct. 197, 19 L.Ed. 343 (1934).
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nation is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against in-
vasion by the States. Accepting that premise, I cannot find
in the respondents' ordinance an obstruction by the State to
the "free exercise of religion" as the phrase was understood by
the founders of the nation, and by the generations that have
followed.20 (emphasis supplied).
The ordinance, held valid in this case, required able bodied
male students of the State University of California to take
instruction in military training.
It is well at this point to weigh carefully the foregoing
summation of the problem in the language of Justice Car-
dozo. It was his judgment that "religious liberty" was pro-
tected by First and Fourteenth Amendments alike. In the
instant case he was looking for an obstruction to the "free
exercise" of religion. Up to the time he wrote this opinion,
more than sixty-five years after the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment, no decision of the Supreme Court had
supported either of the following propositions:
a.-: That the First Amendment is blanketed
into the Fourteenth as a restriction upon the States.
b.-: That the prohibition upon Congress in
the First Amendment respecting an establishment
of religion, is in any way, or for any reason, a re-
striction upon the States.
Both of the foregoing propositions are sustained in the
McCollum case. The authority for these extraordinary ad-
ditions to the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment must
therefore be found-if indeed such authority is to be found
anywhere-in the judicial developments of the past fourteen
years.
After the Hamilton case,2 the first important expres-
sion of the Supreme Court upon this subject came in the
course of a 1940 decision holding that a Connecticut statute
20 Hamilton et al. v. Regents etc. supra, Page (S.Ct.) 205.
21 Hamilton et al. v. Regents etc. supra.
THE CHURCH, THE STATE AND MRS. McCOLLUM 463
prohibiting the solicitation of money for alleged religious,
charitable, or philanthropic purposes without approval of-
the Secretary of Public Welfare, amounted to a state cen-
sorship of religion.2 As such, the Court held that its enforce-
ment deprived the appellant of his liberty without due pro-
cess of law. The appellant Cantwell was a Jehovah's Witness
and his "solicitation" took the form of insulting Catholics
on the streets of New Haven, Connecticut by asking them to
listen to a phonograph record "Enemies," which attacked
the Catholic religion. Since Cantwell had not applied for a
certificate he was arrested and found guilty of violating the
statute. In the course of the Court's decision, Justice Rob-
erts said:-
We hold that the statute as construed and applied to the
appellants, deprives them of their liberty without due process
of law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that Amend-
ment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment. The First Amendment declares that Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof. (sic). The Fourteenth
Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as in-
competent as Congress to pass such laws. The Constitutional
inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double
aspect. On the one hand it forestalls compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of wor-
ship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such
religious organization or form of worship as the individual
may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand
it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion.
... Such censorship (the secretary of public welfare was au-
thorized by the statute to withhold the certificate if he de-
termined that the cause was not religious) of religion as the
means of determining its right to survive is a denial of liberty
protected by the First Amendment and included in the liberty
which is within the protection of the Fourteenth. (emphasis
supplied).
22 Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed.
1213 (1940).
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Here the court makes it reasonably plain that it regards
state laws "respecting an establishment of religion" and
state laws "prohibiting the free exercise thereof" to be equal-
ly and simultaneously outlawed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's embracement of the First.
This was a brand new principle of constitutional law and
it is perhaps for that reason that this long and labored pas-
sage in the Cantwell decision is completely without support-
ing documentation. For the putpose of Cantwell's liberation
it was not necessary for the court to travel this great dis-
tance. The appellant's activities might well have been con-
sidered to be a part of the "religious liberty" and "free exer-
cise of religion" upheld by Justice Cardozo in the Hamilton
case.
2 3
On June 3, 1940, a few weeks after it decided the Cantwell
case. the Supreme court held that consistently with the Con-
stitution of the United States, state school authorities could
require that all public school children render a daily salute
to the flag of the United States and expel those who refused
to do so. 24 For the purposes of this decision, Justice Frank-
furter, speaking for the Court, found it unnecessary to do
more for the merger of the First and Fourteenth than to re-
fer to the "Bill of Rights". He admonished the dissidents "to
fight out the wise use of legislative authority in the forum
of public opinion and before legislative assemblies rather
than to transfer such a contest to the judicial arena."
But in his vigorous dissent Justice Stone was more to the
point:
The law which is thus sustained is unique in the history
of Anglo-American legislation. It does more than suppress
freedom of speech and more than prohibit the free exercise
of religion which concededly (sic) are forbidden by the First
23 Hamilton et al. v. Regents etc. supra.
24 Minersville School District v. Gobites, 310 U. S. 586, 60 S. Ct. 1010, 84 L.
Ed. 1375 (1940).
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Amendment "and" are violati6ns of the liberty guaranteed
by the Fourteenth. For by this law the state seeks to coerce
these children to express a sentiment which... they do not
entertain and which violates their deepest religious convic-
tions. (emphasis supplied). 25
Observe Justice Stone's statement that obnoxious state laws
are forbidden by the First "and" the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. There is a nice lack of discrimination here, which al-
though unimportant in a dissenting opinion and wholly be-
side the point involved in the case he was discussing, pre-
sages precisely what was yet to come.
In the spring of 1943, some of Jehovah's Witnesses were
back again.26 In the meantime the Court had experienced a
change of heart. It now outlawed the compulsory flag sa-
lute and the Gobites case was thus expressly overruled. In
delivering the court's opinion, Justice Jackson becomes ex-
plicit about the new affinity between the First and Four-
teenth Amendments:-
To sustain the compulsory flag salute we are required to
say that a Bill of Rights (sic) which guards the individual's
right to speak his own mind left it open to public authorities
to compel him to utter what is not in his mind. Whether the
First Amendment (sic) to the Constitution will permit offi-
cials to order observance of ritual of this nature does not de-
pend upon whether as a voluntary exercise we would think it
to be good, bad, or merely innocuous...
The Fourteenth Amendment as now applied to the States,
protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its crea-
tures-Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of
course, important delicate and highly discretionary functions,
but none that they may not perform within the limits of the
Bill of Rights.... The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was
to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy .... 27 (emphasis supplied).
25 Minersville etc. supra, note 24 at 601.
26 West Virginia State Board of Education et al. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624,
63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943).
27 Supra, page 634, 637, 638.
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But there is more on this subject:-Not merely the First
now, but each and all of the First Eight Amendments, (The
Federal Bill of Rights) are being corralled into the confines
of the Fourteenth Amendment:
In weighing arguments of the parties it is important to
distinguish between the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as an instrument for transmitting the principles
of the First Amendment, and those cases in which it is ap-
plied for its own sake. The test of legislation which collides
with the Fourteenth Amendment because it also collides with
the principles of the First, is much more definite than the
test when only the Fourteenth is involved. Much of the vague-
ness of the due process clause disappears when the specific pro-
hibitions of the First become its standard.
... It is important to note that while it is the Fourteenth
Amendment which bears directly upon the state it is the more
specific limiting principles of the First Amendment that finally
govern this case. . . . True, the task of translating the ma-
jestic generalities of the Bill of Rights, conceived as a part of
the pattern of liberal government in the eighteenth century,
into concrete restraints on officials dealing with the
problems of the Twentieth Century, is one to disturb self-
confidence. These principles grew in a soil which also pro-
duced a philosophy that the individual was the center of so-
ciety, that his liberty was attainable through mere absence of
governmental restraints and that government should be en-
trusted with few controls and only the mildest supervision
over men's affairs. We must transplant these rights to a soil
in which the laissez-faire concept or principle of non-interfer-
ence has withered at least as to economic affairs, and social
advancements are increasingly sought through closer integra-
tion of society and through expanded and strengthened govern-
mental controls. These changed conditions often deprive pre-
cedents of reliability and cast us more than we would choose
upon our own judgment. (emphasis supplied)
28
As Constitutional Law, practically everything stated by
Justice Jackson in the foregoing quotation is as completely
without precedent as the law he applied in the Nurnberg
Trials. "Precedents" have been deprived of "reliability"
now, and for future interpretations of the Fourteenth
28 Id at 639, 640.
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Amendment,, we are cast upon the "judgment" of Justice
Jackson and his associates.
In their concurring opinion Justice Black and Justice
Douglas speak of the First and Fourteenth Amendments in-
discriminately and although Justice Frankfurter in his dis-
sent condemns the entire opinion, book, page, and verse, he
finds no fault with the conclusion that "the First Amend-
ment has been read into the Fourteenth.1
29
All of the "First and Fourteenth Amendment" cases be-
tween Hamilton v. The Regents8 ° and Everson v. Board of
Education,8 involved the right of individuals to be free from
one or another form of coercion commanded by state laws.
Each case involved an alleged infringement of the litigant's
right to speak out, act, propagandize or refrain from such
public Profession as was involved in a flag salute. Their com-
mon denominator was the alleged state interference with re-
ligious freedom. In none of these cases was the state accused
of preferring one religion over another, or of officially en-
couraging any or all religions. For this-reason the specific
prohibition in the First.Amendment against affirmative acts
"concerning an establishment of religion" was considered for
the first time in the New Jersey School Bus case, decision
delivered on February 10, 1947. In this case a New Jersey
Statute authorized local New Jersey School districts to make
rules and contracts for the transportation of children to and
from schools. The appellee, a township board of education,
pursuant to the statute, authorized reimbursement to par-
ents of money expended by them for the bus transportation
of their children on regular busses operated by public trans-
portation systems. Part of this money was for the payment
of transportation of Catholic children to Catholic Parochial
29 Id at 650.
So Supra.
31 Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing et al., 330 U. S.
1, 67 S. Ct. 962, 91 L. Ed. 711 (1947).
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Schools. It was urged among other things that this payment
amounted to "a use of State power to support church schools
contrary to the prohibition of the First Amendment which
the Fourteenth Amendment made applicable to the State". 2
Any reliance upon the First Amendment in the Jehovah's
Witness cases had been gratuitous and unnecessary. Here,
however, religious freedom was not involved. Now, for the
first time, the question of whether the First Amendment in
all of its provisions was part of the Fourteenth, was vital to
a decision of the case.
In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Black
stated:
But if the law is invalid ... it is because it violates the
First Amendment's prohibition against the establishment of
religion by law.... The New Jersey Statute is challenged as
a law respecting an establishment of religion. The First
Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Four-
teenth, Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105 .. .3 commands that a state "shall make no law respect-
32 Id at 5.
83 (1943) This was another Jehovah's Witness case. It involved the right of
petitioners to distribute handbills from door to door without a license required by
law. The statement in the Courts decision that "The First Amendment, which the
Fourteenth Amendment makes applicable to the States declares, etc." (quoting the
Amendment). Neither decisions nor other authority is cited to substantiate this
conclusion which is apparently relied upon by the Court in the Everson Case to
support a similar statement made there. In a dissenting opinion to the Murdock
Case, justice Reed says: "The real contention of the witnesses is that there can be
no taxation of the occupation of selling books and pamphlets because to do so
would be contrary to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which
is now held to have drawn the contents of the First Amendment into the category
of individual rights protected from State deprivation", citing Gitlow v. New York,
268 U. S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138 (1925) Near v. Minnesota, 283 U .S.
697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931) and Cantwell v. Connecticut, note 22 supra.
The Gitlow case said merely that "freedom of speech and the press-which are pro-
tected by the First Amendment from abridgment by' Congress-are among the
fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States." In the Near case
justice Hughes, speaking for the court stated: "It is no longer open to doubt
that the liberty of the press and of speech is within the liberty safeguarded by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by State action.
It was found impossible to conclude that this essential personal liberty of the citi-
zen was left unprotected by the general guaranty of fundamental rights of person
and guaranty of fundamental rights of person and property."-Here is no mention
of the First Amendment at all. The Cantwell case has already been discussed here-
in, at note 22 supra.
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ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof."... Whether this New Jersey law is one respect-
ing the "establishment of religion" requires an understanding
of the meaning of that language particularly with respect
to the imposition of taxes.... The "establishment of religion"
clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a
State nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions
or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influ-
ence a person to go to or remain away from church against
his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any re-
ligion. No person can be punished for entertaining or profes-
sing religious beliefs or disbeliefs for church attendance or
non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions ....
Neither a State nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organiza-
tions or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson the
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended
to erect "a wall of separation between Church and State" 34
(emphasis supplied).
The court, over violent dissent by four justices finally
decided-that the New Jersey Law provided for an indiscrim-
inate public service to the children involved and did not re-
sult in "an establishment of religion". But the stage was now
set for Vashti McCollum. When the Court stated that now,
American government is just as powerless to "aid all reli-
gions" as it is to "prefer one religion over another" or "set
up a church" it reduced the McCollum case to a mere ques-
tion of fact. First of all it is one thing and a proper thing to
protect a Jehovah's Witness in his undoubted right to relig-
ious freedom or to freedom of speech. To do this effectively it
was entirely unnecessary for the Supreme Court to -twist and
torture the First Amendment into its consideration of the
Fourteenth. The decision of Justice Sanford in the Gitlow
case 3r like that of Chief Justice Hughes in Near v. Minneso-
ta,86 protected these basic liberties against state violation
34 Everson v. Board, supra note 31, at 16.
85 See note 33, supra.
36 See note 33, supra.
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without any reference to the First Amendment. It is iron-
ical that both of these decisions are cited by the present
court in its frequent assertions that the First Amendment
is now a part of the Fourteenth.87  By turning the First
87 To say that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to bring
the First Amendment into it in terms is to overlook one revealing and contradict-
ing chapter of our history. Here is the recital of this chapter from American
Church Law by Carl Zollman, pages 75-76: Events now followed fast on each
other's heels. Grant, in his annual message of 1875, recommended an amendment
to the United States Constitution forbidding the teaching in any public school of
religious tenets and further prohibiting "the granting of any school funds, or
school taxes, or any part thereof, either by legislative, municipal, or other authori-
ty, for the benefit or in aid, directly or indirectly, of any religious sect or denomi-
nation." One week after the submission of this message, James G. Blaine, the
plumed knight, who was then the leader of the House, and who, nine years later,
was defeated by Grover Cleveland in a contest for the presidency, introduced a
rather colorless resolution for a constitutional amendment which on August 4, 1876,
was overwhelmingly passed by the House. The famous Tilden-Hayes campaign in
the meantime had come into being, and this matter now became one of its issues.
Accordingly, the Republican National Platform of 1876 called for an amendment
to the Federal Constitution forbidding "the application of any public funds or
property for the benefit of any school or institution under sectarian control. When
the constitutional amendment, submitted by Blaine, in a greatly strengthened form,
was finally voted on in the Senate, it resulted, on August 14, 1876, in a strictly
partisan vote, all Republican Senators voting for and all Democratic Senators
voting against it, and was lost because it had not received the necessary two-thirds
majority. With this vote the agitation for a federal amendment has come to an
end.
And here is the Amendment which was an issue in the Presidential election of
1876. Remember that the Fourteenth Amendment had been in effect since 1868:
4 CONG. R1c. pt. 1, XX, 5580. This resolution reads as follows: "No State shall
make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof; and no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any
office or public revenue of, nor any loan of credit by or under the authority of,
the United States, or any State, Territory, District or municipal corporation, shall
be appropriated to, or made or used for, the support of any school, educational or
other institution, under the control of any religious or anti-religious sect, organiza-
tion, or denomination, or wherein the particular creed or tenets of any religious or
anti-religious sect, organization, or denomination shall be taught; and no such
particular creed or tenets shall be read or taught in any school or institution sup-
ported in whole or in part by such revenue or loan of credit; and no such appro-
priation or loan of credit shall be made to any religious or anti-religious sect, or-
ganization or denomination, or to promote its interests or tenets. This article shall
not be construed to prohibit the reading of the Bible in any school or institution;
and it shall not have the effect to impair rights of property already vested. Con-
gress shall have power, by appropriate legislation, to provide for the prevention
and punishment of violations of this article." If the Fourteenth Amendment em-
braced the First in 1868, why did Congress feel it necessary in 1876 to attempt to
propose another amendment specifically restricting the states in the terms used to
restrict Congress in the First Amendment? Since this suggested specific prohibition
against State established religions was expressly rejected by Congress, in 1876, by
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Amendment in all of its terms into a restriction upon the
states, the Court has added nothing to the security of full
personal freedom that was not already provided for it by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth. By this process
however the Court has outlawed every affirmative act by
state government that may subsequently be construed to
"aid all reizgions". The full implication of this restriction is
too broad for immediate comprehension but before the Mc-
Collum case left the Supreme Court at least one of the con-
curring justices had begun to be apprehensive about them.
In his concurring opinion Justice Jackson stated:
i think . . . that we should place some bounds on the
demands for interference with local schools that we are em-
powered or willing to entertain.... I make these reservations
as a matter of record in view of the number of litigations
likely to be started as a result of this decision.... The plain-
tiff, as she has every right to be, is an avowed atheist. What
she has asked of the Courts is. that they not only end the
"released time" plan but also ban every form of teaching which
suggests or recognizes that there is a God.... This Court is
directing the Illinois Courts generally to sustain plaintiff's
complaint without exception of any of these grounds of com-
plaint, without discriminating between them and without
laying down any standards to define the limits of the effect
of our decision.... While we may and should end such formal
and explicit instruction as the Champaign plan . . . I think
it remains to be demonstrated whether it is possible even if
desirable, to comply with such demands as plaintiffs' com-
pletely to isolate and cast out of secular education all that
some people may reasonably regard as religious instruction.
(emphasis supplied) 88
justice Jackson may well worry about the future of
American education "isolated" and cast off from all that
Vashti McCollum may reasonably regard as religious. A few
of the many and widely diversified materials that would
virtue of what does the Supreme Court write it into the Constitution in 1948? It
will likewise be noted that the suggested but rejected 1876 Amendment was far less
severe in its terms than the restrictions now written into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment by the Supreme Court in the McCollum decision.
- 88 See note 1, at page -.
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have to be removed from the study of American history and
government as a pre-requisite to the establishment of such a
godless system of education are: The Declaration of Inde-
pendence, The Mayflower Compact, Washington's Farewell
Address, Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, Madison's Journals
of the proceedings of the Federal Constitutional Conven-
tion, Thomas Paine's Common Sense, The Articles of Confed-
eration, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 ", The Constitu-
tions of practically every State in the Union, including Vash-
ti McCollum's own state of Illinois 40, and last but not least
The Constitution of the United States itself, to which this
atheist appealed for "an establishment" of isolated secular
religion. For who, after all is this "Our Lord" referred to
just above the signature of "George Washington, President,
and Deputy from Virginia"?
Granting the Court's defacto application of the First
Amendment to the States, it should have gone no farther
than to prevent the official establishment or encouragement
of one preferred sect of religion over another with its impli-
cit burdens and or disqualifications upon non-conformers.
This has been the complete goal of all "dis-establishers"
since the passage of the English Conventicle Act in 1665. To
say that dis-establishment or no establishment requires the
complete secularization of government is to confuse the sepa-
39 "Article I. Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good
government and the happiness of mankind, schools, and the means of education
shall forever be encouraged." It will be observed that knowledge was third in the
order of time and importance in the education system envisioned for the North-
west Territory of which Illinois is a part. The congressional Enabling Act of 1818,
expressly provided that the Constitution for the proposed State of Illinois should
not be repugnant to the provisions of the Ordinance of 1787 above quoted. Except
when its provisions conflict with the Constitution of Illinois, the Ordinance of
1787 is still in effect in that state, Phoebe v. Jay, 1 Ill. 268 (1828).
40 "We the people of the State of Illinois, grateful to Almighty God for the
civil, political and religious liberty which He hath so long permitted us to enjoy,
and looking to Him for a blessing upon our endeavors to secure and transmit the
same unimpaired to succeeding generations-in order to form a more perfect gov-
ernment, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for common defense,
promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our
posterity, do ordain and establish this constitution for the State of Illinois."
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ration of Church (creed) and State with an entirely different
concept which would separate and isolate Religion from
Government and Law. At the present time, each of the
United States has accomplished the first type of separation
at the state level, but no existing government anywhere with
the exception of Soviet Russia and her recently acquired
Communist satellites has pretended to accomplish the second.
If the McCollum case decides that we must purge our offi-
cial life, state and federal, of religious practices, and observ-
ances, then it amounts to a prescription for American revo-
lution. How can governments, state and federal, organized
"to secure these rights" with which we are endowed "by our
Creator" officially divorce themselves from necessary pre-
suppositions involving God and Eternity? Where and in
what period of American history was such a notion ever en-
tertained?
Here is what another Supreme Court of the United
States said upon this subject in 1892: Its importance to this
issue requires that it be quoted at length.
But beyond all these matters, no purpose of action against
religion can be imputed to any legislation, State or Nation,
because this is a religious people. This is historically true.
From the discovery of this continent to the present hour there
is a single voice making this affirmation. The commission to
Christopher Columbus prior to his sail westward is from
"Ferdinand and Isabella, by the grace of God,--King and
Queen of Castile," and recites that "it is hoped that by God's
assistance some of the continents and islands in the ocean will
be dfscovered." The first colonial grant, made to Sir Wal-
ter Raleigh in 1584, was from "Elizabeth by the grace of
God, of England and Ireland queen, defender of the faith".
The grant authorizes him to enact statutes for the government
of the proposed colony provided that "they be not against
the true Christian faith". The first Charter of Virginia ...
commenced the grant in these words: We greatly commend-
ing and graciously accepting of their desires for the further-
ance of so noble a work, which may by the Providence of
Almighty God, hereafter tend to the Glory of his divine Ma-
jesty, in propagating of Christian religion to such people as
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yet live in darkness and miserable ignorance of the true knowl-
edge and worship of God... Language of similar import may
be found in the subsequent charters of that colony ... and
the same is true of the Various charters granted to the other
colonies. In language more or less emphatic is the establish-
ment of the Christian religion declared to be one of the pur-
poses of the grant. The celebrated compact of the Pilgrims
in the Mayflower, 1620, recites: "Having undertaken for the
Glory of God and advancement of the Christian faith, and
the honor of our King and Country, a Voyage to plant the
first Colony in the northern parts of Virginia: Do by these
Presents, solemnly and mutually, in the presence of God and
one another, covenant and combine ourselves together into a
Civil Body Politick, for our Better ordering and preservation,
and Furtherance of the Ends aforesaid."
The fundamental orders of Connecticut, under which a
provisional government was instituted in 1638-1639, com-
mence with this declaration: "Forasmuch as it hath pleased
All-mighty God by the wise disposition of his divyne pruidence
so to Order and dispose of things that we the Inhabitants and
Residents of Windsor, Hartford and Wethersfield are now
cohabiting and dwelling in and upon the river of Conectecotte
and the Lands thereunto adjoining; and well knowing where
a people are gathered together the word of God requires that
to mayntayne the peace and union of such a people there
should be an orderly and decent Government established ac-
cording to God, to order and dispose of the affairs of the
people at all seasons as occasion shall require; do therefore
associate and conioyne our selves to be as one Publike State
or Commonwealth; and do, for our selves and our Successors
and such as shall be adjoined to us at any time hereafter, en-
ter into Combination and Confederation together, to maintain
and preserve the liberty and purity of the gospel of our Lord
Jesus, we now profess, as also the disciple of the Churches,
according to the truth of the said gospel is now practiced
amongst us."
In the charter of privileges granted by William Penn to
the province of Pennsylvania, in 1701, it is recited: "Be-
cause no People can be truly happy, though under the great-
est enjoyment of Civil Liberties, if abridged of the Freedom
of their Consciences, as to their Religious Profession and
Worship; and Almighty God-being the only Lord of Con-
science, Father of Lights and Spirits; and the Author as well
as Object of all divine Knowledge, Faith and Worship, who
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only doth, enlighten the Minds, and persuade and convince
the Understandings of people, I do hereby grant and de-
clare," etc.
Coming nearer to the present time, the Declaration of In-
dependence recognized the presence of the Divine in human
affairs in these words: "We hold these truths to be self-evi-
dent, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness." "We,
therefore the Representatives of the United States of Amer-
ica, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Su-
preme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions,
do, in the Name and by Authority of the good people of these
colonies, solemnly publish and declare," etc.: "and for the
support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the Pro-
tection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each
other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our Sacred Honor."
If we examine the constitution of the various states we
find in them a constant recognition of religious obligations.
Every constitution of every one of the forty-four states con-
tains language which either directly or by clear implication
recognizes a profound reverence for religion and an assump-
tion that its influence in all human affairs is essential to the
well being of the community. This recognition may be in
preamble, such as is found in the Constitution of Illinois,
1870; "We, the people of the State of Illinois, grateful to Al-
mighty God for the civil, political and religious liberty which
He bath so long permitted us to enjoy, and looking to him
for a blessing upon our endeavors to secure and transmit the
same unimpaired to succeeding generations," etc.
It may be only in the fimiliar requisition that all officers
shall take-an oath closing with the declaration "so help me
God." It may be in clauses like that of the Constitution of
Indiana, 1816, article XI., section 4: "The manner of adminis-
tering an oath or affirmation shall be such as is most consist-
ent with the conscience of the deponent, and shall be esteemed
the most solemn appeal to God." Or in provisions such as are
found in Articles 36 and 37 of the Declaration of Rights of
the Constitution of Maryland, 1867: "That as it is the duty
of every man to worship God in such manner as he thinks
most acceptable to Him, all persons are equally entitled to
protection in their religious liberty; wherefore, no person
ought, by any law, to be molested in his person or estate on
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account of his religious persuasion or 1rofession, or for his
religious practice, unless, under the color of religion, he shall
disturb the good order, peace, or safety of the State, or shall
infringe the laws of morality, or injure others in their natural,
civil or religious rights; nor ought any person to be compelled
to frequent or maintain or contribute, unless on contract, to
maintain any place of worship, or any ministry; nor shall any
person, otherwise competent, be deemed incompetent as a
witness, or juror, on account of his religious belief: Provided,
He believes in the existence of God, and that, under his dis-
pensation, such person will be held morally accountable for
his acts, and be rewarded or punished therefor, either in this
world or the world to come. That no religious test ought ever
to be required as a qualification for any office of profit or
trust in this State, other than a declaration of belief in the
existence of God; nor shall the Legislature prescribe any
other oath of office than the oath prescribed by this consti-
tution." Or like that in articles 2 and 3, of Part 1st, of the
Constitution of Massachusetts, 1780: "It is the right as well
as the duty of all men in society publicly and at stated sea-
sons, to worship the Supreme Being, the great Creator and
Preserver of the universe.
. . . As the happiness of a people and the good order and
preservation of civil government essentially depend upon
piety, religion, and morality, and as these cannot be gen-
erally diffused through a community but by the institutions
of the public worship of God and of public instructions in
piety, religion and morality: Therefore, to promote their hap-
piness and to secure the good order and preservation of their
government, the people of this commonwealth, have a right
to invest their Legislature with power to authorize and re-
quire and the Legislature shall, from time to time, author-
ize and require, the several towns, parishes, precincts, and
other bodies-politic or religious societies to make suitable
provision, at their own expense, for the institution of the pub-
lic worship of God and for the support and maintenance of
public Protestant teachers of piety, religion, and morality in
all cases where such provision shall not be made voluntarily."
Or as in sections 5 and 14 of article 7, of the Constitution of
Mississippi, 1832: "No person who denies the being of a God,
or a future state of rewards and punishments, shall hold any
office in the civil department of this State.... Religion, mor-
ality, and knowledge being necessary to good government, the
preservation of liberty, and the happiness of mankind, schools,
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and the means of education shall forever be encouraged in
this State." Or by Article 22 of the Constitution of Delaware,
1776, which required all officers, besides an oath of allegiance,
to make and subscribe the following declaration: "I, A.B., do
profess faith in God, the Father, and in Jesus Christ His only
Son, and in the Holy Ghost, one God, blessed for evermore;
and I do acknowledge the Holy Scriptures of the Old and new
Testament to be given by divine inspiration."
Even the Constitution of the United States which is sup-
posed to have little touch upon the private life of the individ-
ual, contains in the 1st Amendment a declaration common to
the constitutions of all the States, as follows: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof." etc. And also provides in
article 1, section 7; (a provision common to many constitu-
tions); that the Executive shall have ten days (Sundays ex-
cepted) within which to determine whether he will approve or
veto a bill.
There is no dissonance in these declarations. There is a uni-
versal language pervading them all, having one meaning; they
affirm and reaffirm that this is a religious nation. These are
not individual sayings, declarations of private persons; they
are organic utterances; they speak the voice of the entire
people. While because of a general recognition of this truth
the question has seldom been presented to the courts, yet we
find that in Updgraph v. Com. 11 Serg. & R. 394, 400 it was
decided that "Christianity, general Christianity, is, and always
has been, a part of the common law of Pennsylvania;
not Christianity with an established church, and tithes, and
spiritual courts; but Christianity with liberty of conscience to
all men." And in People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns, 290, 294, 295,
Chancellor Kent, the great commentator on American law,
speaking as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New York,
said: "The people of this State in common with the people of
this country, profess the general doctrines of Christianity,
as the rule of their faith and practice; and to scandalize the
author of these doctrines is not only, in a religious point of
view, extremely impious, but even in respect to the obligations
due to society, is a gross violation of decency and good order.
The free, equal, and undisturbed enjoyment of religious opin-
ion, whatever it may be, and free and decent discussions on
any religious subject, is granted and secured; but to revile,
with malicious and blasphemous contempt, the religion pro-
fessed by almost the whole community, is an abuse of that
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right. Nor are we bound, by any expressions in the Constitu-
tion, as some have strangely supposed, either not to punish
at all, or to punish indiscriminately, the like attacks upon the
religion of Mahomet or of the Grand Lama; and for this
plain reason, that the case assumes that we are a Christian
people, and the morality of the country is deeply ingrafted
upon Christianity, and not upon the doctrines of worship of
those impostors." And in the famous case of Vidal v. Gir-
ard,43 U. S. 2 How. 127,198, this court, while sustaining the
will of Mr. Girard, with its provision for the creation of a
college into which no minister should be permitted to enter,
observed; "It is also said, and truly, that the Christian re-
ligion is a part of the common law of Pennsylvania."
If we pass beyond these matters to a view of American life
as expressed by its laws, its business, its customs and its so-
ciety, we find everywhere a clear recognition of the same truth.
Among other matters note the following:
The form of oath universally prevailing, concluding with
an appeal to the Almighty; the custom of opening sessions
of all deliberative bodies and most conventions with prayer;
the prefatory words of all wills, "In the name of God, amen;"
the laws respecting the observance of the Sabbath; with the
general cessation of all secular business, and the closing of
courts, Legislatures, and other similar public assemblies on
that day; the churches and church organizations which
abound in every city, town, and hamlet; the multitude of
charitable organizations existing everywhere under Chris-
tian auspices; the gigantic missionary associations, with gen-
eral support, and aiming to establish Christian missions in
every quarter of the globe. These, and many other matters
which might be noticed, add a volume of unofficial declara-
tions to the mass of organic utterances that this is a Christian
nation.41 (emphasis supplied).
Nothing needs to be added to Justice Brewer's masterful
and complete documentation. In this respect, the Constitu-
tion of the United States is the same to-day as it was when
this opinion was delivered in 1892. It is obvious, however,
that something of a very material nature has since been
added to the popular as well as the judicial concept of Amer-
41 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 12 S. Ct. 511,
36 L. Ed. 226 (1892).
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ican institutions. Principles formerly taken for granted are
now denied. William Penn startled nobody when he said
that those men who will not be governed by God must be
ruled by tyrants. A hundred years later the first Constitu-
tion of the State of Pennsylvania provided that:
All men have a natural and unalienable right to worship"
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own con-
sciences and understanding; and that no man ought or of
right can be compelled to attend any religious worship, or
erect or support any place of worship, or maintain any min-
istry, contrary to or against, his own free will and consent:
Nor can any man who acknowledges the being of a God,
be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right, as a citizen,
on account of his religious sentiments or peculiar mode of
religious worship; and that no authority can or ought to be
vested in or assumed by any power whatsoever, that shall in
any case interfere with, or in any manner control the right of
conscience in the free exercise of religious worship. (Empha-
sis supplied).
Yet at the same time, as a matter of course and without
popular objection the same Constitution provided:
And each member (of the House of Representatives), be-
fore he takes his seat, shall make and subscribe the following
declaration:'
"I do believe in God, the Creator and governor of the uni-
verse, the rewarder of the Good and the punisher of the
wicked. And I do acknowledge the Scriptures of the Old and
New Testament to be given by Divine inspiration." And no
further or other religious test shall ever hereafter be required
of any civil officer or magistrate in this state.
42
This was substantially the requirement in all of the or-
iginal states at that time. The "wall of separation" was pur-
posely kept low enough to permit the state government to
benefit by divinely revealed truth in the possession of leg-
islators who recognized and believed it. Whatever may be
the prevailing modern view, on and off of the bench, with
reference to the secularization of government, the record is
42 Pa. Const. Art. II, §- 10 (1776). Poore, FEDERAL AND STATE CoNsTrsTioxs
II, 1541-42 (1878).
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clear on the point that the Founding Fathers would have
none of it. Whatever may be the present state of the popular
mind on the subject of the strictly secular state, it is cer-
tainly not the type or kind of government enshrined in our
American constitutional system. A deliberate turn to godless
government augurs more than is involved in such eminently
practical matters as continued tax exemption for churches,
the modification of our coinage, and the status of present
laws against blasphemy and immorality. On the theoretical
side such a turn takes us immediately to the base and foun-
dation of personal rights. If these rights are divine endow-
ments, as the Declaration of Independence says they are, no
government that guards them can ever be completely godless.
On the contrary, if as in the secular state, there is no official
recognition of the divine, personal rights remain only so long
as they are tolerated by government. This, of course, is tyr-
anny. What the "Wall of Separation" erected in the McCol-
lum case really does, is to fence man off from his time-hon-
ored right of Sanctuary.
Clarence E. Manion.
